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Abstract 
This paper is the first paper to present findings evaluating the consequences for employees of full and 
partial privatization using difference-in-differences combined with propensity score matching. We find: 
(1) partial privatization causes job creation in contrast to full privatization, which destroys jobs, (2) full 
privatization causes higher labor productivity improvement than partial privatization, (3) wage increases 
occur only in partially privatized firms and (4) there are small increases in labor quality investment in 
both cases. The results suggest partial privatization exploits market discipline to induce labor 
productivity whilst simultaneously providing welfare improvements for labor. This is the ‘win-win’ 
outcome predicted by the ‘helping hand’ theory of government. Our results suggest that governments are 
likely to gain wider support for a program of partial privatization rather than full privatization. 
JEL classification: C21, L33, D23, P26  
Keywords: Multiple treatments; Average treatment effect; Propensity score matching; 
Privatization evaluation 
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Non-Technical Summary  
Two dominant views seek to explain the robust empirical evidence that state-owned firms  are less 
efficient than private firms. First, the “political view” contends that the state promotes social and political 
objectives that might be in conflict with the profit-maximization objective. Second, the “managerial view” 
emphasizes the existence of agency problems in SOEs and the absence of any effective mechanism to 
attenuate managers’ non-profit-maximizing behavior. Both views impute that aggregate welfare would be 
maximized if ownership and control rights in SOEs are privatized and firms’ decision processes totally 
depoliticized.  
Firms in the private sector also have their corporate governance problems. The agency theory of the firm 
recognizes that managers might be seeking to maximize an objective function that includes, inter alia, firm 
size and the consumption of perquisites rather than maximize firms. In light of this problem, some level of 
political ownership and control will mitigate managerial agency costs because politicians do not want the 
resources over which they have influence to be diminished. In addition, the “helping hand” theory of 
government argues that a certain level of state ownership may have beneficial effects on stakeholders’ 
welfare. In the context of a developing economy, proponents of this view argue that the government-firm 
relationship can be a means of circumventing problems associated with market failures; such as the lack 
of secure property rights, institutional discrimination against private investors, poor corporate governance 
mechanisms and managerial incentive problems. This “helping hand” view of political control therefore 
contrasts with the view of political control as a source of inefficiency.  
 This paper provides a systematic analysis of the causal effects of different degrees of privatization – 
minority private, majority private and wholly private – on labor welfare. In the analysis, we consider four 
aspects of labor welfare: employment, wages, productivity and training. Using data from the recent full 
and partial privatization experience of Western China we find that full privatization causes the highest 
labor productivity improvements but also causes job losses. Moreover, the insignificant effect of full 
privatization on wages suggests employees do not share in the rents generated by labor productivity 
improvements. This might reflect the manner in which post-privatized enterprises address the pre-
privatization legacy of extra-marginal wage payments and effectively reduce wages. Therefore, exposing 
former SOEs to the full force of market discipline and incentives creates both winners and losers. In 
contrast, the results for partial privatization are particularly striking in that we find evidence of labor 
productivity improvements, job creation and wage improvements. This is the ‘win-win’ scenario predicted 
by “helping hand” theory. Market discipline and incentives are driving labor productivity improvements 
whilst a government “helping hand” simultaneously protects labor welfare via job creation and higher 
wages.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The economy of China’s western regions lags behind eastern regions in terms of 
economic development and it is still dominated by state owned enterprises (SOEs). As 
part of the Western Development Strategy (WDS), the Chinese government has 
sought to establish a modern corporate governance system and reduce its share of 
state capital in SOEs. This has involved a program of full and partial privatization – 
majority and minority private ownership – of SOEs. Such a program is a rare event 
which we exploit in order to determine and quantify the causal effects of full, majority 
and minority privatization on productivity, employment, wages and labor training. 
Whilst there is an extant empirical and theoretical literature examining privatization 
(see Megginson and Netter (2001) for a review), there is a paucity of research 
concerning the consequences of partial privatization. Gupta (2005) is a notable 
exception, finding that partial privatization where the government remains the 
controlling owner has a positive impact on productivity. 
 
Two dominant views seek to explain the robust empirical evidence that SOEs are less 
efficient than private firms (e.g. Megginson and Netter, 2001). First, the “political 
view” contends that the state promotes social and political objectives that might be in 
conflict with the profit-maximization objective (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994). Second, the “managerial view” emphasizes the existence of agency 
problems in SOEs and the absence of any effective mechanism to attenuate managers’ 
non-profit-maximizing behavior (Fama, 1980 and Vickers and Yarrow, 1990). Both 
views impute that aggregate welfare would be maximized if ownership and control 
rights in SOEs are privatized and firms’ decision processes totally depoliticized. 
 
Firms in the private sector also have their corporate governance problems. The agency 
theory of the firm recognizes that managers might be seeking to maximize an 
objective function that includes, inter alia, firm size and the consumption of 
perquisites rather than maximize firms’ profits (e.g. Williamson, 1964; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In light of this problem, some level of political ownership and 
control will mitigate managerial agency costs because politicians do not want the 
resources over which they have influence to be diminished (Brada, 1996). In addition, 
the “helping hand” theory of government argues that a certain level of state ownership 
may have beneficial effects on stakeholders’ welfare (Che and Qian, 1998; Qian, 
2003). In the context of a developing economy, proponents of this view argue that the 
government-firm relationship can be a means of circumventing problems associated 
with market failures; such as the lack of secure property rights, institutional 
discrimination against private investors, poor corporate governance mechanisms and 
managerial incentive problems. This “helping hand” view of political control 
therefore contrasts with the view of political control as a source of inefficiency.  
 
To our knowledge, economic theory does not offer guidance on the trade-off between 
the political “helping hand” and agency costs theories of government ownership. In 
other words, what is the optimal political involvement in order to minimize agency 
costs? Privatization is a key process in the depoliticization of an economy and there is 
concern as to its impact on stakeholders’ welfare. This is particularly important if the 
government is to gain support for its program of reform via privatization. Assessing 
the welfare effects is ultimately an empirical issue and contingent on whose welfare is 
being examined e.g. labor, managers, private investors or government. This paper is 
concerned with the welfare of labor.  
 
 
 The issue of evaluating the causal impact of privatization is beset by selection 
problems in that the incidence of privatization is not randomly determined across the 
population of firms. A novelty of the paper is the application, for the first time in this 
context, of a multiple treatments propensity score matching method (Imbens, 2000 
and Lechner, 2001) combined with difference-in-differences analysis. Multiple 
treatments propensity score matching ensures that estimates are free from selection 
bias into privatization schemes whilst difference-in-differences controls for 
enterprise-specific effects as well as time effects that are contemporaneous with 
privatization.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.  
Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology employed to isolate the causal effects 
of different degrees of privatization on labor. Section 4 describes the data set used in 
the paper. Section 5 discusses the main findings from the analysis. Section 6 
concludes. 
                  
2. BACKGROUND 
A theoretical objection to partial privatization is that government will interfere in 
order to pursue its objectives. Such objectives include, inter alia, the pursuit of 
employment (Boycko et al., 1996). There is also the suggestion that employees in 
government-controlled enterprises receive extra-marginal wage payments (Bhaskar et 
al., 2006). Such political pressures lead to under-performance and the inefficient 
allocation of resources (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In the context of Shleifer and 
Vishney’s (1994) model, politicians would pursue the partial privatization of 
 
 
enterprises when it allows them to extract more employment and wages from private 
owners. Thus, politicians are privatizing cash flows and exploiting the market 
incentives in which managers operate in order to achieve more of their social 
objectives through partial privatization than through state ownership. 
 
The government might partially privatize and retain an ownership stake in order to 
indicate to investors that it will not implement policies detrimental to the interests of 
the firm (Perotti, 1995). If the government takes a passive role and does not use its 
ownership stake to wield influence, partial privatization can be motivated by 
government desire to impose market discipline on managers. Indeed, Gupta (2005) 
reports significant improvements in the labor productivity of Indian firms following 
partial privatization. If inefficiencies are a consequence of over-employment and 
extra-marginal wage payments, managers will be motivated to improve performance 
by reducing employment and wage levels. Moreover, Boycko et al. (1996) argue that 
it is harder for politicians to influence managerial behavior when firms are not state 
owned because subsidy to pay for over-staffing is transparent i.e. the government will 
have to make subsidies known. 
 
From an agency theory perspective, agency problems will exist when ownership and 
control are separate, even if government seeks to maximize the value of SOEs 
(Mengistae and Xu, 2004). Agency theory predicts weak corporate governance will 
allow managers to pursue sub-optimal levels of over-employment (Williamson, 1964). 
Indeed, the SOE ownership structure means that there is no individual with financial 
incentives to monitor and discipline managerial under-performance. In addition, 
 
 
market discipline from the product market is problematic since SOEs are often subject 
to soft budget constraints.  
 
Partial privatization creates an event for distinguishing between political and agency 
perspectives (Gupta, 2005). With full privatization it is not known whether post-
privatization effects are a consequence of less political interference or better 
information on managers’ performance. With partial privatization, the state often 
retains control but if the firm becomes publicly listed it will reveal more information. 
This makes it easier to make comparisons between state and privately owned firms. 
When such comparisons are possible, the government will use information on private 
sector firms in order to constrain the over-staffing behavior of state firms (Bhaskar et 
al., 2006). Partial privatization might curb government enthusiasm for over-staffing 
and extra-marginal wage payments if financial incentives from its ownership stake 
outweigh political objectives leading to over-staffing. It is not clear, however, whether 
government control attenuates the potential gains from exposing SOEs to market 
forces. Boubraki et al. (2005) find that government relinquishment of control is an 
important determinant of performance improvements, while Gupta (2005) finds that 
the government does not need to relinquish control for partial privatization to have a 
positive impact on performance. 
 
China’s privatization program was initiated by central government’s decentralization 
program during the 1980s. The aim was to create a functioning market that would 
replace central planning in the allocation of resources to productive activity. In 1993, 
partial privatization was allowed to take place and involved selling a minority stake in 
SOEs to private individuals. This was part of a wider corporatization program that 
 
 
required SOEs to establish western-style governance structures that included 
shareholders, a board of directors and a chair of the board and CEO posts (Aivazian et 
al., 2005). At this initial stage, the sale of a majority controlling stake to private 
investors was prohibited, largely for ideological reasons (Fan et al., 2007). 
 
Pressure for restructuring arose due to the accumulation of non-performing loans, the 
South East Asian financial crisis potentially causing problems due to the relationship 
between SOEs and state owned banks (SOBs) (i.e. soft budget constraints were 
supported by SOBs), and central government’s desire to join the WTO (Rawski, 2002; 
Jefferson and Su, 2006). The Chinese government initiated three industrial 
restructuring policies: furlough, conversion of most SOEs, and intensification of the 
shareholding program (Rawski, 2002; Jefferson and Su, 2006). Under the popular 
slogan “retain the large, release the small”, a large number of SOEs and collective-
owned firms were on the list of formal conversion in the following years. This 
conversion, along with other measures, was intended to achieve former Premier Zhu 
Rongji’s three year schedule to turn loss-making SOEs to profit-making ones. 
According to some scholars, the shareholding system was made a centerpiece in the 
Chinese Communist Party’s 15th Party Congress in 1997 of the enterprise 
restructuring. This shift towards the corporatization and privatization of SOEs 
provided incentives for managers to improve firm performance (Aivazian et al., 2005; 
Jefferson and Su, 2006).  
 
3. MODELING FRAMEWORK 
In this paper, each firm can be thought of as being under any of four treatments or 
schemes: no restructuring, minority privatization, majority privatization and full 
 
 
privatization, denoted as ,  , and  respectively. We denote the status of 
firm i as  or , for j=0, 1, 2 and 3. Thus, for example,  indicates 
that firm i has undergone a minority privatization, 0 otherwise. We denote the 
potential outcomes associated to each of the treatments as ,  and , where 
y denotes the outcome variable of interest (e.g. wages). The problem is estimating the 
causal effect of one treatment j relative to another treatment k,  
0S 1S 2S 3S
0=jiS 1=jiS 11 =iS
10 , ii yy 2iy 3iy
ikijjk yy −=δ .          (1) 
Since each firm is subject to only one of the treatments and the remaining two 
potential outcomes are unobserved, the problem of estimating jkδ  is tantamount to 
estimating missing data. Thus to make the problem tractable, we concentrate on 
identifying the average effect of treatment  relative to treatment ,  jS kS
             { } { } { }1|1|1| =−===−=Δ jiikjiijjiikijjk SyESyESyyE    (2)                                
 
Causal inference relies on the construction of the counterfactual for the last term in 
equation (2), which is the outcome participants of treatment  would have 
experienced, on average, had they participated in treatment . This is estimated by 
the corresponding average value of the outcome variable for the participants of 
treatment  
kS
jS
kS
{ 1| }=ikikyE δ .         (3) 
An important feature in the accurate construction of the counterfactual is the selection 
of a valid group of firms with which to estimate expression (3). In this respect any 
estimation method has to overcome the problem of selection bias. In our case, firms 
that are targets for privatization or partial privatization are likely to have different 
 
 
characteristics than firms that experienced no restructuring. The approach we take 
here is to employ propensity matching techniques originally proposed for the binary 
treatment case by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and extended to the multiple 
treatments case by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001). The method of matching seeks 
to control for all those observable variables, say X, that are responsible for selection 
bias. In this paper X consists of quadratic functions of three observable characteristics 
that are hypothesized to impact on the probability of a firm being subject to 
privatization or partial privatization. These are the pre-restructuring size, age and 
productivity. 
 
The fundamental assumption of the method of matching is that conditional on X, the 
distribution of the counterfactual outcome 
 
iky in the group receiving treatment  is 
the same as the observed distribution of 
 
jS
iky in the group receiving treatment . In 
this case, the average outcome of the matched firms in non-treated cases constitutes 
the correct sample counterpart for the missing information on the outcomes that the 
treated would have experienced, on average, if they had not been treated. This 
assumption therefore ensures that the counterfactual is accurately estimated using data 
from suitable firms that have not been subject to the relevant treatment. Under this 
assumption, matching based on the propensity score ensures the balancing of the 
observable characteristics X in the two groups that are being compared (i.e. j and k). 
The propensity score for firm i, , is defined as the probability of receiving 
treatment  relative to the probability of receiving treatment  
kS
ijkP
jS kS
)|1(
)|1(
XSP
XSPP k
i
j
i
ijk =
==         (4) 
 
 
where the probabilities are predicted from ordered probit regressions given that the 
treatments (no, minority, majority and full privatization are naturally ordered). 
 
In general the matching estimator of the causal effect of treatment S relative to 
treatment can be written as 
j
kS
∑ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∑−=Δ
∈ ∈j kSl Si iijkljk
yPgy )(ˆ       (5) 
where g(.) is a function assigning the weights to be placed on the comparison firms in 
treatment group  used as matches for participant of treatment .  kS jS
 
When there are repeated observations for the same set of participants over time 
(indexed by t), it is arguably more reliable to base the evaluation analysis on the 
difference between the variable of interest at a year s after the treatment year (viz. 
) and its value in the year prior to the treatment (viz. ), that is 
 (e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). In this case the combined 
differences-in-differences and matching estimator is defined as  
sity + 1−ity
1−++ −=Δ tstsit yyy
∑ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∑ Δ−Δ=Δ
∈ ∈ ++j kSl Si sitijksltjk
yPgy )(ˆ      (6) 
Here we evaluate the effects of privatization at the year of privatization and the first 
two post-restructuring years, that is for s=0,1,2 and 3. Throughout we impose the so-
called common support condition in the matching algorithm. This involves dropping 
firms belonging to treatment group  whose propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of firms in the comparison 
group . 
jS
kS
 
 
 
The different matching estimators proposed in the literature (such as the nearest 
neighbors and kernel estimators) differ from each other in the choice of the weighting 
function they employ. However, they share the same property of being consistent 
estimators of the treatment effect under consideration. Nevertheless, they can exhibit 
substantial small sample differences. In this paper we discuss results from the nearest 
neighbor matching estimators, but we have also experimented with different 
weighting schemes, including local linear regression matching. 
 
4. DATA 
For our econometric analysis we use the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics compiled by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSB) spanning the 
period 1999-2005. The report covers the population of state-owned enterprises and all 
non-state firms with an annual turnover of over five million Renminbi (just above 
US$600,000).  It is estimated that the firms contained in the dataset account for 85-90 
percent of total output in most industries. The NSB performs several tests to ensure 
the accuracy of the information in the report. These include identifying and 
eliminating illogical data points (e.g. negative sales and implausible growth rates) and 
ensuring the consistency of the reported figures. In view of the objective of this paper, 
the econometric work is confined to domestic-owned enterprises in Western China 
that started with no private investment (i.e. wholly state-owned enterprises) , some of 
which subsequently registered private capital participation. 
 
The NSB assigns to each firm in the database a categorical variable indicating its 
ownership status. Nevertheless, using the database, it is also possible to construct a 
continuous measure of private ownership composition by looking at the fraction of 
 
 
paid-in capital by private investors. This is the key variable in this paper since it helps 
us identify whether the firms are wholly or partially (minority/majority) privatized.  
 
Table 1. Sample frequency distribution of privatized firms by year 
Type of  privatization   Calendar year  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Non-privatized     1,634 
Minority private 90 58 16 16 180 
Majority private 107 63 21 9 200 
Wholly private 109 60 44 30 243 
Total     2,257 
NOTE: The sample spans the period 1999-2005, guaranteeing that all firms have at least one 
year of pre-privatization and two years of post-privatization observations. 
 
Our methodology relies on controlling for pre-treatment characteristics via the 
propensity score. It is therefore necessary to have some information in the year 
preceding the receipt of private finance. Furthermore, a realistic evaluation of post-
treatment growth effects requires the availability of at least two years data after 
acquisition. For these reasons, we only consider full and partial privatizations that 
took place between 2000 and 2003. In the final analysis, a total of 2257 firms are 
available for the analysis. We ascertain that 623 of these firms received some private 
investment for the first time between 2000 and 2003. Table 1 gives the frequency 
distribution of the privatizations by degree of privatization and by year. 
 
 
 
5. MAIN FINDINGS 
Table 2. Ordered probit coefficient estimates and marginal effects of the 
determinants of privatization 
 Coefficients Marginal effects at mean values of regressors 
  Non 
privatised 
Minority 
private 
Majority 
private 
Wholly 
private 
Size 0.950*** -0.298*** 0.067*** 0.096*** 0.135*** 
 (6.862) (-6.974) (6.014) (6.291) (6.837) 
Size squared -0.066*** 0.021*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (-6.114) (6.162) (-5.509) (-5.683) (-6.035) 
Labor 
productivity 
0.330** -0.103** 0.023** 0.033** 0.047** 
 (2.406) (-2.421) (2.356) (2.384) (2.426) 
Labor 
productivity 
squared  
0.007 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.535) (-0.534) (0.534) (0.534) (0.534) 
Age -0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.248) (1.248) (-1.242) (-1.244) (-1.247) 
Age square 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.762)* (-1.762)* (1.744)* (1.751)* (1.759)* 
Size*age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.943) (0.943) (-0.941) (-0.941) (-0.942) 
Size*Labor 
productivity 
-0.014 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.783) (0.784) (-0.781) (-0.782) (-0.785) 
Threshold 1 4.278***     
 (7.870)     
Threshold 2 4.579***     
 (8.410)     
Threshold 3 5.021***     
 (9.195)     
Observations 2257     
Pseudo R-
square 
.0901     
Log likelihood  -1828.277     
NOTE: (i) t-statistics in parentheses; (ii) all regressions include provincial dummies, (iii) * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
The results from the ordered probit regressions of the determinants of privatization are 
reported in Table 2. We find that the most important determinants of privatization in 
Western China between 2000 and 2003 are firm size (number of employees) and labor 
productivity (log of output per worker). In particular, there is an inverted U-shaped 
 
 
relationship between firm size and its likelihood of being fully or partially privatized. 
Furthermore, higher SOE labor productivity is associated with a higher probability of 
being fully privatized. It appears, therefore, that the government is not instigating full 
privatization in order to induce performance improvements as a consequence of being 
exposed to the market mechanism. Rather, those firms that do not require a “helping 
hand” and with the best chances of survival are being fully privatized. We also find 
some weak evidence that relatively younger SOEs are more likely to be privatized.  
 
As far as the matching method is concerned, the most important issue is to ensure that 
the propensity score obtained from the ordered probit regressions are successful in 
controlling for firm-specific differences in the pre-privatization period. It is therefore 
important to test whether the covariates in the ordered probit regressions are balanced 
in all treatment pairs of interest, two tests of balancing are performed to this end. 
First, for each covariate in the ordered probit regressions, we test for equality of 
means across treatment pairs using standard t-tests. These tests are reported in Table 
3.1 and indicate support for our matching approach. Second, we test whether the 
cross-treatment group differences of the covariates can be taken as jointly 
insignificant. This test is known as Hotelling’s T-squared test. It has the flexibility of 
being based either on all observations or for separate segments of the sample defined 
by the propensity score estimates. In this study we divide the sample into four equal 
parts (i.e. by propensity score quartile), and conduct Hotelling's T-squared test within 
each part. The results of these balancing tests are reported in Table 3.2 and it is 
reassuring to confirm that the covariates are balanced in all treatments pairs, providing 
further support for the validity of our approach. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. Balancing test 1. Average values of pre-treatment characteristics in 
matched and unmatched samples 
 
Variable Sample Minority private vs. 
Non-privatized 
Majority private vs. 
Non-privatized 
Wholly private vs. 
Non-privatized 
  Treated Control t-stat Treated Control t-stat Treated Control t-stat 
Size Unmatched 5.6705 5.2104 3.89 6.0141 5.2104 7.2 5.6817 5.2104 4.69 
 Matched 5.6705 5.6452 0.16 6.0141 5.8753 1.03 5.6817 5.8405 -1.41 
Size squared Unmatched 34.473 29.406 3.9 38.089 29.406 7.06 33.601 29.406 3.82 
 Matched 34.473 33.721 0.41 38.089 36.039 1.25 33.601 35.505 -1.44 
Productivity Unmatched 3.7785 3.2385 5.72 3.9345 3.2385 7.8 4.09 3.2385 10.47 
 Matched 3.7785 3.6406 1.12 3.9345 3.8493 0.8 4.09 4.0942 -0.04 
Productivity 
Squared 
Unmatched 15.546 11.948 5.92 16.559 11.948 7.83 17.713 11.948 10.71 
 Matched 15.546 14.524 1.24 16.559 15.883 0.79 17.713 17.916 -0.25 
Age Unmatched 60.339 34.782 2.75 48.71 34.782 1.69 44.613 34.782 1.31 
 Matched 60.339 36.933 1.08 48.71 47.495 0.06 44.613 50.605 -0.32 
Age squared Unmatched 62535 10208 2.91 39736 10208 1.83 32858 10208 1.55 
 Matched 62535 21672 0.97 39736 37527 0.06 32858 47617 -0.4 
Size * Age Unmatched 321.32 184.41 2.94 305.95 184.41 2.68 242.04 184.41 1.58 
 Matched 321.32 227.96 0.78 305.95 219.11 0.92 242.04 283.2 -0.44 
Size * 
productivity 
Unmatched 21.583 16.922 7 23.377 16.922 10.34 23.056 16.922 10.82 
 Matched 21.583 20.723 0.91 23.377 22.517 1.11 23.056 23.74 -0.98 
 
Table 3.2. Balancing test 2. Hotelling test of joint significance of pre-treatment 
characteristics by propensity score quartiles 
 
Propensity score quartile Minority private 
vs. non  
privatised 
Majority 
private vs. non 
privatised 
Wholly private 
vs. non 
privatised 
 F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value 
1 0.1549 1.6312 1.6312 0.1549 0.9754 0.5136 
2 0.1303 1.6659 1.6659 0.1303 1.4415 0.219 
3 0.0749 1.8919 1.8919 0.0749 0.9055 0.5151 
4 0.4136 1.0334 1.0334 0.4136 1.2823 0.253 
 
 
 
Table 4. Difference-in-differences analysis combined with nearest neighbour 
matching 
 Time 
lag 
Employment 
 
Wages 
 
Labor 
Productivity 
Labor training 
 
  estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value 
Minority 
private 
         
 0 0.026 0.528 0.091 1.366 0.284*** 2.742 0.027*** 4.692 
 1 0.123** 2.117 0.14* 1.877 0.203** 2.073 -0.026 -1.373 
 2 0.079 1.032 0.127 1.267 0.284** 2.131 -0.007 -0.386 
Majority 
private 
         
 0 0 -0.008 -0.005 -0.095 0.158*** 2.302 0.02*** 3.453 
 1 0.15*** 2.533 0.146** 2.043 0.186** 2.032 0.001 0.108 
 2 0.218*** 2.928 0.162* 1.793 0.288*** 2.625 0.015 0.63 
Wholly 
private 
         
 0 -0.075* -1.927 0.03 0.584 0.27*** 3.517 0.022** 2.233 
 1 -0.103** -2.271 0.039 0.53 0.346*** 4.31 -0.025 -1.061 
 2 -0.043 -0.764 0.065 0.765 0.404*** 3.185 -0.009 -0.393 
 
We now turn to the discussion of the causal effects of the various degrees of 
privatization on the welfare of labor. Table 4 reports the labor market effects of 
privatization based on the difference-in-differences nearest neighbor matching 
analysis and several points are noteworthy. First, full privatization leads to detrimental 
employment effects. A year after being fully privatized, erstwhile SOEs employ on 
average 10 percent less people compared to equivalent firms that are otherwise state 
owned. By contrast, firms with a mixed private-state ownership structure generate 
statistically and economically significant jobs. Minority privatization causes 
employment to increase by about 12% the year following the restructuring and 
employment is about 22% higher for majority private enterprises two years after 
partial privatization. Second, full privatization does not appear to benefit workers in 
the form of higher wages. In comparison, partial privatization leads to about 14% and 
16% increase in workers’ remuneration for minority and majority private enterprises, 
 
 
respectively. Thus our findings on the employment and wage effects of partial 
privatization accord with both the “helping hand” theory of government (Qian, 1996, 
2003) and with politicians to exploiting market incentives to generate cash flows that 
can be used to pursue social objectives.  
 
Third, irrespective of the degree of privatization, labor productivity consistently 
exhibits a dramatic improvement following enterprise restructuring. For majority and 
wholly private enterprises, labor productivity constantly increases during the three 
post-restructuring periods under study. Additionally, labor productivity improvements 
are maximized when the enterprise is wholly privatized. This result supports the view 
that government ownership is not conducive to profit maximization (Boycko et al., 
1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). It is worth noting that this robust increase in labor 
productivity does not appear to be fully translated into wage increases, perhaps 
reflecting that employees were awarded extra-marginal wage payments while being 
employed by the state. 
 
Finally, we find some evidence that privatization leads to an increase in the quality of 
labor, as reflected by the amount of labor training received by workers. Almost 
identically across the various degrees of privatization, managers of newly privatized 
enterprises have spent just above 2 percent more on the training of each worker. This 
suggests that our reported increases in labor productivity cannot be accounted for by 
increases in labor quality, but rather by managers of newly privatized enterprises 
adopting practices that improve labor utilization. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Difference-in-differences analysis combined with local linear regression 
matching 
 
 Time 
lag 
Employment 
 
Wages 
 
Labor 
Productivity 
Labor training 
 
  estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value 
Minority 
private 
         
 0 0.018 0.57 0.049 1.017 0.213*** 3.116 0.026*** 4.203 
 1 0.117*** 3.685 0.166*** 3.59 0.202*** 2.988 -0.015 -1.485 
 2 0.057 1.04 0.103 1.591 0.251*** 3.104 0.001 0.102 
Majority 
private 
         
 0 -0.021 -0.671 -0.035 -0.992 0.137*** 2.433 0.021*** 4.330 
 1 0.005 0.137 0.047 1.067 0.19*** 3.093 -0.007 -0.711 
 2 0.032 0.662 0.031 0.561 0.282*** 4.304 0.015 0.832 
Wholly 
private 
         
 0 -0.059** -2.249 0.03 0.784 0.234*** 4.842 0.022*** 2.400 
 1 -0.083** -2.336 0.007 0.132 0.314*** 6.119 -0.017 -0.811 
 2 -0.038 -0.903 0.027 0.504 0.397*** 4.865 -0.018 -0.924 
 
 
Table 5 gives results based on the difference-in-differences linear regression matching 
analysis. While, the nearest neighbor method matches each privatized firms with 
exactly one non-privatized firm that is most similar to it, linear regression matching 
uses a weighted average of several control group observations leading to more 
efficient estimators. However, this potential efficiency gain comes at the expense of 
increasing estimator bias since inexact matching can occur as one widens the 
matching region. In any case, it is reassuring to note that the findings discussed above 
do not change significantly when this alternative weighting scheme is employed.   
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The privatization literature has largely neglected the issue of partial privatization. The 
purpose of this paper is to contribute to the privatization literature by providing a 
systematic analysis of the causal effects of different degrees of privatization – 
minority private, majority private and wholly private – on labor welfare. In the 
analysis, we consider four aspects of labor welfare: employment, wages, productivity 
and training. We treat the privatization decision as endogenously determined and use 
multiple treatments propensity score matching to ensure that estimates are free from 
selection bias. This is combined with a difference-in-differences approach to control 
for enterprise-specific effects as well as time effects that are contemporaneous with 
the privatization event. 
 
Using data from the recent full and partial privatization experience of Western China 
we find that full privatization causes the highest labor productivity improvements but 
also causes job losses. Moreover, the insignificant effect of full privatization on wages 
suggests employees do not share in the rents generated by labor productivity 
improvements. This might reflect the manner in which post-privatized enterprises 
address the pre-privatization legacy of extra-marginal wage payments and effectively 
reduce wages. Therefore, exposing former SOEs to the full force of market discipline 
and incentives creates both winners and losers. In contrast, the results for partial 
privatization are particularly striking in that we find evidence of labor productivity 
improvements, job creation and wage improvements. This is the ‘win-win’ scenario 
predicted by “helping hand” theory. Market discipline and incentives are driving labor 
productivity improvements whilst a government “helping hand” simultaneously 
protects labor welfare via job creation and higher wages. Creating a ‘win-win’ 
 
 
situation is important if the government is to create vested interests that support a 
program of privatization reform.  
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